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ABSTRACT 
There is a variety of forest management institutions ranging from state management to 
community and private management. This article attempts to identify the conditions 
under which one institution outperforms the others in the efficiency of forest 
management based on a review of the literature, empirical evidence on the dominant 
forest management institutions, and theoretical arguments. In conclusion, we argue that 
the community management system performs best for non-timber forests, whereas a 
mixed management system, in which forest protection is carried out communally and 
tree management is carried out individually, is likely to work best for timber forests. 
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I. Introduction 
Why is there a variety of forest management institutions, ranging from stare 
management with state ownership of forests, voluntary or informal community 
management without formal use rights, state-community co-management with 
community use rights (e.g. Nepal) or without such rights (e.g. India), private 
management with private ownership rights, and community ownership of forestland 
combined with private ownership of trees (e.g. dammar trees in community-owned 
forests in Southern Sumatra)? Considering that community and private management 
systems are relatively common among different management systems, the important 
practical question is under what conditions community forest management outperforms 
private management and vice versa.
1
 A related question is whether there is an 
institution which can be more efficient, equitable, and sustainable than community and 
private management institutions. 
Despite the central role of institutions in determining the management efficiency 
of forests, the forestry literature as well as common-property literature seldom raises the 
questions posed above.
2
 Ostrom (1990), Baland and Platteau (1996), and Hayami and 
                                                   
1It must be pointed out that government agencies are involved in the management of 
community forestry in practice (e.g. Murty, 1994; Chakraborty, 2001; Paudel et al., 
2012). 
2To our knowledge, the major exceptions include Grafton (2000) and Sakurai et al. 
(2004). 
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Godo (2005), among others, argue that community management is an efficient 
management institution in many cases because of the community’s strong ability to 
prevent excessive extraction of community-owned resources.
3
 Indeed, Edmonds (2002) 
points out that transferring the use rights of forests from the state to local communities 
in the hill region of Nepal is associated with a significant reduction in forest resource 
extraction. On the other hand, the influence of the argument by Hardin (1968) on the 
tragedy of the commons is still pervasive in economists’ consideration of common 
property resource management. For example, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2009, p. 673) 
argue in the seventh edition of their microeconomics textbook that “common property 
resources are those to which anyone has free access. As a result, they are likely to be 
over-utilized.” Perloff (2012, pp. 622-24) in the sixth edition of his microeconomics 
textbook seems to agree with this view and further asserts that private management with 
clear ownership rights is the more desirable system because “converting 
common-access property to private property removes the incentive to overuse it.”4Thus, 
which institution, community or private, is more appropriate has not been resolved in 
the literature.
5
 
                                                   
3As is argued by Agrawal and Gibson (1999), detailed institutional rules rather than the 
mere practice of community-based management may be of critical importance.  
4I do not agree with the presumptions of these authors that common property is open or free access 
and that private property can be protected without cost.  
5A literature review by Lund et al. (2009, p. 71) points out regarding community forest 
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As Otsuka and Place (2001) argue, another shortcoming of the existing literature 
on forest management is its almost exclusive focus on forest protection or the 
prevention of excessive forest resource extraction without considering how to promote 
investments in forests for reforestation. This point is practically important in view of the 
widespread deforestation and degradation of forest conditions in developing countries. 
At present, the rehabilitation of forests is as important as or possibly more important 
than the protection of forests. 
Based on a review of the literature on forest management and empirical evidence 
on the dominant forest management institutions as well as theoretical arguments, this 
article attempts to identify the conditions under which one institution outperforms the 
others in the efficiency of forest management. In conclusion, we argue that community 
management performs best for non-timber forests,
6
 whereas mixed management, in 
which forest protection is carried out communally and tree management is carried out 
individually, is likely to work best for timber forests in developing countries.   
The organization of this article is as follows: we provide the theoretical frame 
work to consider the optimum forest management institution in Section II. Based on the 
                                                                                                                                                     
management that it is not clear “where, how, and under what conditions popular 
participation in forest management is feasible, or perhaps the superior approach to 
forest conservation.” 
6Non-timber forest products are particularly important for the livelihood of the poor (e.g. 
Beck and Nesmith, 2001; Kumar, 2002). 
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empirical regularities on the prevailing forest management institutions in various 
settings, Section III offers theoretical hypotheses. The hypotheses are tested by using 
evidence provided by case studies in Section IV. Finally Section V discusses a plea for 
further studies on the identification of optimal forest management institutions.  
 
II. Theoretical framework 
 While economists commonly recognize that “the tragedy of the commons” is 
not a necessary consequence of the commons, they tend to focus on the extent of the 
over-exploitation of common-property resources. In other words, Ostrom (1990) and 
others argue that the community has the ability to prevent the over-exploitation of forest 
resources by organizing collective action, and monitoring and enforcing collective 
agreements. What is missing is the issue of investing in tree resources, managing them, 
and rehabilitating forests. This is important in view of the widespread deforestation and 
degradation of forests throughout developing countries, so that the restoration and 
rehabilitation of forests have become critically important policy issues. Another 
omission in the literature, which is also potentially important, is the role of the private 
management of forests; it is best in terms of the provision of incentives to manage 
forests, and thus we should not easily dismiss this institutional form of forest 
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management. 
 From the theoretical point of view, we should consider both the cost of 
protecting forest resources and management intensity in identifying the optimal forest 
management institutions.
7
 This point is illustrated in Table 1, which identifies four 
types of forest characteristics.
8
 We consider that the management intensity is high (or 
low) when the marginal returns to management effort or investment in improving forest 
conditions are high (or low). 
Usually non-timber trees can re-grow after felling without much care, which 
means that the marginal returns to management effort are low. On the other hand, to be 
successful, timber production requires intensive management or such silvicultural 
operations as planting, weeding, pruning, singling, and thinning, which may be 
considered as investments as they bear fruit in the future. Thus, non-timber and timber 
forests are characterized by low and high management intensity, respectively. The cost 
of protecting forest resources is low in areas where such resources are abundantly 
available. This is the case in sparsely populated areas in developing countries. It is also 
low in areas where the demand for minor forest resources, such as firewood, charcoal, 
                                                   
7For simplicity, we do not consider the external effects, e.g. the impact of the effective management 
of community forestry on reducing pressure on government forests located nearby (Köhlin and Parks, 
2001). 
8Needless to say, the efficiency of community forestry depends on the community 
characteristics (e.g. Gautam, 2007). For simplicity, we abstract away the role of 
community characteristics in forest management. 
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and feed grasses, is low. This is likely to be the case in developed countries. The cost of 
protecting minor forest resources in developing countries is usually high because such 
minor products extracted in one place cannot be easily distinguished from those in other 
places. In contrast, the cost of protecting timber is likely to be low because big trees 
cannot be felled and hauled without being noticed by local people. 
Thus, both the cost of protection and management intensity are low in 
non-timber forests in sparsely populated areas (see the left-upper corner). In the case of 
non-timber forests in densely populated areas (see the left-lower corner), management 
intensity is low but the cost of protection is likely to be high. In contrast, management 
intensity is high in the case of timber forests, as the production of valuable timber 
requires silvicultural operations. If the demand for minor forest products is low, e.g. in 
developed countries, timber forest is characterized by high management intensity and 
low protection cost (the right-upper corner). On the other hand, the demand for minor 
forest products is generally high in developing countries, particularly in densely 
populated areas. Even though big timber trees can be easily protected, it is likely to be 
costly to protect green branches and fodder grasses. Therefore, timber forests in 
developing countries are typically characterized by high protection cost and high 
management intensity (see the right-lower corner). 
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 State ownership can hardly be qualified as a desirable institution because the 
state lacks the resources to protect forests and the motivation to manage trees.
9
 In fact, 
state forests are usually de facto open access (e.g. Metz 1991; Kumar 2002; Tachibana 
and Adhikari 2009). According to Grafton (2000), the community management system 
is efficient in the sustainable management of forests and the provision of substantial 
benefits to forest users, to the extent that collective interests are accounted for in the 
decision making and the cost of collective action is reasonably low. Although it is not 
clear what “reasonably low” means, we interpret this to mean that the cost of protection 
under community management is lower than that under state and private management 
because community management is effective in enforcing collective agreements as 
community members know each other and the punishment can include such heavy 
penalties as ostracism. Moreover, there are scale economies in protecting forest 
resources: patrolling the entire forest by a few people on the basis of rotation or by 
hiring a small number of watchers will be cheaper than patrolling small patches of forest 
by owners individually. 
 This argument does not immediately imply that community management is 
optimal because it is deficient in providing work incentives. In principle, all community 
                                                   
9State ownership may be justified, however, if the protection of forests creates positive 
externalities in areas outside the state forests, such as stable supply of water or the 
prevention of floods downstream. 
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members are supposed to participate in protecting forest resources and to share the 
benefits more or less equally. In terms of incentives to work, community management is 
low and similar to the commune system in China in which the income from farm 
production is shared equally by a large number of commune members (Lin 1988). Thus, 
from the theoretical point of view, which forest management institution, including 
community and private management, is most efficient is unclear. In order to explore 
efficient forest management institutions, we undertake a review of the relevant literature 
in the succeeding two sections.  
  
III. Empirical Regularities and Hypotheses
10
 
 The Japanese experience provides useful lessons to draw insights into 
appropriate forest management institutions. It was common knowledge in mountainous 
villages in Japan before World War II that three types of forest institutions coexisted: 
private timber forests near residential areas; community forests for extracting charcoal, 
firewood, and feed grasses located not too far away from the village; and state-owned 
virgin forests located very far from the village. Community forests were covered by 
                                                   
10Our analysis is confined to East and South Asia, as community management is more 
widely practiced there than in Southeast Asia (Sunderlin, 2006). Yet, community 
management is also common in Mexico (e.g. Klooster, 2002) and is emerging in some 
areas in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Jumbe and Angelson, 2006). 
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deciduous trees and managed effectively, particularly after community ownership rights 
were granted during the Meiji era (1868 to 1912). All community members participated 
in burning off dead branches in early spring to kill the seeds of weeds. They were 
allowed to collect only the assigned amount of minor forest resources and only on 
“open days” of the forest (McKean 1992). Surprisingly, such management rules are very 
similar to those currently adopted in the hill region of Nepal. 
 The location of private, community, and state forests in prewar Japan makes 
sense in view of our theoretical framework portrayed in Table 1. Since timber 
production requires intensive management, its location near residential areas is most 
convenient. Also the cost of protecting valuable timber trees is low in such areas. Since 
the production of minor forest products does not require so much management effort, its 
location away from the residential area does not cause much problem except for the 
prevention of the excessive extraction of forest resources. Virgin forests located very far 
away from the village are state owned because village people do not have strong interest 
in such forests.     
The management of community forests in Japan experienced drastic changes 
after World War II. Because of the introduction of kerosene, electricity, and tractors, the 
demand for minor forest products, such as charcoal, firewood, and feed grasses for draft 
11 
 
animals virtually disappeared. On the other hand, the demand for timber soared due to 
the construction boom which began with the onset of the miraculous economic growth 
around 1955. In consequence, non-timber trees were replaced by timber trees. 
Community forest users in many locations agreed to subdivide the forest land into 
smaller parcels either with individual ownership rights or with individual use rights 
(Kijima et al., 2000).
11
 This change is consistent with our expectation because the cost 
of protecting minor forest products declined, so that providing the proper work 
incentives has become a major issue of forest management. 
 Similar changes seem to have taken place in China, where degraded forests had 
been converted from collective management to either private management with 
individual use rights (e.g. Fujian, Jiangxi, and Yunnan provinces) or smaller group 
management of several households with group use rights (Holden et al., 2013). Such 
changes were not imposed from above but voluntarily made by forest users. Since forest 
land tenure institution reforms have been just implemented, it is too early to assess their 
impact on forest management. There are, however, indications that they have positive 
impacts, for example, on tree planting. Most likely farmers planted timber trees or fruit 
                                                   
11The ownership of community forest was registered under the names of all the users, so 
that in order to confer private ownership rights on small parcels, the consent of all the 
users was required. Yet, the certificates of ownership rights were sometimes lost, and 
some descendants of original owners were no longer residents or were missing. In such 
cases, only the individual use rights were granted to the sub-divided parcels, or the 
traditional community management system was maintained.  
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trees, both of which require the careful management of the trees. How the protection of 
such high-value trees can be carried out, however, is not clear from the available 
studies. 
In northern Vietnam where forests were state-owned, rapid deforestation took 
place in the 1980s and early 1990s (Tachibana et al., 2001; Sikor, 2001). Similar to 
China, the collective management of degraded forests has been replaced by individual 
management since the mid-1990s. Sikor (2001) finds that such a change quickly 
resulted in the rehabilitation of the degraded forests. 
In the mid-hill region of northern Vietnam, it was observed that small round 
hills, which look like coffee cups placed upside down, coexisted with flat paddy fields.
12
 
Interestingly such hills are covered by timber trees, trees providing thatching materials, 
bamboo, and medicinal plants. Such hill forests contrast greatly with collectively-owned 
state forests, which are located on mountainous terrain and an almost completely 
denuded. Actually such hill forests are privately owned and managed,
13
 and farmers 
harvest mature trees and replace them with younger trees. According to the owners of 
such private forests, they plant and replant trees and undertake weeding so as to 
                                                   
12The story reported below is based on interviews by the senior author of this article 
with farmers in the locality. 
13Such forests have been managed over generations. Interestingly, the Vietnamese 
government did not pay attention to such forest land and so did not nationalize its 
ownership rights. 
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maximize the income or profit from their forests. Theft by outsiders is a potential 
problem, but since hills are surrounded by roads and residential houses, the cost of 
protection is not excessively high. This is somewhat similar to the privately-owned trees 
grown near the residential areas in the Japanese villages before World War II. 
In South Asia such as India and Nepal, there has been a shift from state 
ownership/management of forests to community management with the devolution of 
forest use rights from the former to the latter as in the case of community forest 
management in Nepal and co-management between the state and community as in the 
joint forest management (JFM) in India (Fisher, 1999). There are many recent studies 
which are critical of the JFM system because of the low share of sales revenue for 
users,
14
 the ban on felling timber trees, the increasing control of the government, and 
the lack of communal tenure security (Fisher, 1999; Ballabh et al., 2002; Bhattacharya 
et al., 2010). These studies commonly admit, however, that JFM contributed to the 
increased availability of non-timber forest products. The last point is critically important, 
as it suggests that JFM, or community management, is conducive to the growth of 
non-timber trees, but not necessarily of timber trees.  
Poudel et al. (2013) find in the terai region of Nepal that timber forests have 
                                                   
14Ballabh et al. (2002) point out that only 25 percent of the proceeds from timber are 
distributed to forest users.  
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recovered from serious deforestation and degradation after forest use rights were handed 
over to the community. According to Paudel et al. (2012), Nepal’s forest policy 
deliberately discourages timber harvesting and trading by putting strict regulatory 
controls over timber harvesting and allowing such non-competitive organizations as 
syndicates to control the timber market. Thus, how efficient the community 
management of timber forests is cannot be ascertained from the study of Poudel et al. 
(2013) partly because of the absence of other management institutions and partly 
because of the excessive control of timber harvesting and trading by the government.  
Although local communities, known as Community Forest User Groups 
(CFUGs) are managing forests under mutually agreed and officially approved forest 
operational plans in Nepal, there are few official or institutional interactions and little 
communication between CFUGs and forest authorities regarding forest management for 
timber (Banjade et al., 2011). Such scant communication regarding timber management 
indicates that the forest authorities may perceive CFUGs as an inefficient body to 
manage the forest for timber production. Meanwhile, a gradual shift from collective 
management of timber forest by unpaid community labor to the use of hired wage labor 
or contract systems between CFUGs and groups of workers has been taking place. 
Observing the change in harvesting practices in community forestry from collective 
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labor to hired labor or contractor systems, Pokharel (2000) argues that such changes in 
community forestry are due to the lower efficiency of community labor in timber 
harvesting.   
 To summarize, it seems reasonable to argue that community forest management 
is successful in the conservation of forests or the prevention of over-exploitation of  
the non-timber forest resources as is observed in prewar Japan, India and Nepal, 
whereas privatized or individualized management is preferred for the management of 
timber forests as in postwar Japan, as well as contemporary China and Vietnam. It is not 
clear, however, whether and to what extent the protection of non-timber minor forest 
products are important in China and Vietnam. If there is substantial demand for such 
products, the cost of protection may also be high. Also it is not clear to what extent the 
community mechanism is used to protect individually-owned forest resources in these 
countries.  
Based on these discussions, we would like to postulate the following 
hypotheses regarding the optimum institutions to manage forests: 
 Hypothesis 1: Non-timber forests can be managed efficiently by communities 
because they have the capacity to prevent the over-exploitation of non-timber minor 
forest products. 
16 
 
Hypothesis 2: Timber forests can be managed effectively by a combination of 
individualized and community management institutions because the major management 
issues are to undertake silvicultural operations, which require proper work incentives, 
and to undertake the protection of trees, which may be most effectively carried out by 
the community. 
The forest characteristics under which these hypotheses are valid are illustrated 
in Table 2, which shows the appropriate management institutions of timber and 
non-timber forests. In the case of non-timber forests where the cost of protection is high, 
community management is hypothesized to be the most efficient organization (see the 
left-lower corner), which corresponds to Hypothesis 1. In the case of non-timber forests 
with abundant supplies of non-timber products, there is no scarcity value of such 
products and, hence, institutions do not matter (see the left-upper corner). In timber 
forests where the cost of protection is low, private management is optimal (see the 
right-upper corner). The cost of protection is likely to be low in developed countries, 
where the demand for non-timber forest products, such as firewood and charcoal, are 
low.
15
 Finally, in the case of timber forests where the cost of protection is high, e.g. in 
most developing countries, we advance the hypothesis that some sort of mixed private 
                                                   
15This justifies the forest management by private companies in Canada and New 
Zealand. 
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and community management is optimal, as private management is conducive to the 
efficient management of trees and community management is effective in the protection 
of forest resources. Thus, mixed management institutions, in which forest land is owned 
by the community and trees are owned by individual members or in which small 
patches of forest land are owned by individuals and forest products are protected jointly 
by the community, may be efficient. 
 
IV. Empirical Evidence  
 There is ample evidence that non-timber forests are effectively managed by 
local communities in India (e.g. Murty, 1994; Kumar, 2002; Baland et al., 2010; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2010) and in the hill region of Nepal (e.g. Edmonds, 2002; Gautam, 
Shivakoti and Webb, 2004; Tachibana and Adhikari, 2009),
16
 so that excessive 
extraction of non-timber resources is prevented. Although the evidence is qualitative, 
non-timber forests were effectively managed by communities in prewar Japan (McKean, 
1992). Thus, Hypothesis 1 seems to be supported empirically. 
 It is interesting to learn that private management of timber trees on formerly 
cultivated marginal crop fields in the terai region of Nepal is very costly because most 
                                                   
16Literature reviews on community forest management in Asia by Bowler et al. (2012) 
and Waylen et al. (2010) support this observation. Also Klooster (2002) argues that 
community forestry in Mexico contributes to the conservation of forests. 
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owners must hire permanent watchers who live in the cottages at the edge of timber 
parcels, even though each parcel is tiny (Sakurai et al., 2004). These authors also point 
out that private owners allocate large amounts of time to take care of the trees. It seems 
clear that private management provides strong work incentives, but the cost of 
protection under this system tends to be high. On the other hand, private management of 
timber forests was more active in thinning planted trees than community management in 
postwar Japan (Kijima, Sakurai and Otsuka, 2000).
17
 The protection of trees was no 
longer important in postwar Japan and, hence, private management was likely to be 
more efficient than community management, as far as timber forests were concerned.  
Baland et al. (2010) and Bhattacharya et al. (2010) report that community 
management of timber forests in India is ineffective in the production of valuable timber 
trees because of the absence of incentives to carry out silvicultural operations. Sakurai 
et al. (2004) report that compared with the ordinary community management system, a 
centralized community management system, in which the community forest user group 
committee hires workers to take care of trees, while all the community members 
participate in the protection of timber trees, is efficient. These authors suggest that 
similar to private forest owners, community forest user committees consisting of 15 
                                                   
17Community management persisted in some areas in Japan in which ownership rights 
of forestland were so unclear that the subdivision of forest land was infeasible. 
19 
 
people or so seem to be interested in maximizing the benefit of their members by 
employing hired workers to take care of trees, rather than relying on community labor. 
Since mixed private-community management systems have seldom been 
practiced in developing countries, we cannot directly test the validity of Hypothesis 2. 
However, the empirical evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 2 that mixed community 
and individualized systems are more conducive to the protection and management of 
timber trees than community management. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 In view of the increasing threat of climate change, it is becoming critically 
important not only to protect forests and deter deforestation but also to rehabilitate 
degraded forests. This study has found that community management or co-management 
between community and government has contributed to the rehabilitation of forests. 
This study has also found that the mixed private-community management system, in 
which the forest is protected by the community and trees are managed individually, is 
likely to work best in the management of timber forests. Such a system, if efficient and 
profitable, can contribute to the expansion of timber forests, which would be conducive 
to the sequestration of greenhouse gases and the improvement of the living standards of 
20 
 
forest users. 
 Although empirical evidence seems to support the validity of the two 
hypotheses postulated in this study, it is not totally conclusive. Particularly inconclusive 
is the validity of Hypothesis 2, as it cannot be directly tested by the actual data. In order 
to verify its validity, randomized controlled trials are recommended in which 
comparisons are made between randomly selected control groups (e.g. groups of forests 
in which ordinary community management is practiced) and treatment groups (i.e. 
groups of forests in which mixed management is practiced). A review of the literature 
on community-based project management by Mansuri and Rao (2004), a review of 
community forest management by Bowler et al. (2012), and an empirical study of 
community forest management by Baland et al. (2010) all reach the same conclusion for 
the implementation of randomized controlled trials. We have to recall that the 
community management of timber tree planting projects, called community or social 
forestry, has been supported by international organizations, such as the World Bank, 
Food and Agriculture Organization, and Asian Development Bank, and individual donor 
organizations, such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency, without carefully 
analyzing whether this institution is most appropriate for establishing timber forests. 
Thus, identifying the most efficient timber forest management institution can have 
21 
 
profound implications on the promotion of tree planting projects in developing 
countries. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Timber and Non-timber Forests 
 Management Intensity 
Low High 
 
Cost of 
Protection 
Low 
Non-timber forests in 
sparsely populated areas 
Timber forests with low demand 
for non-timber products 
High 
Non-timber forests in 
densely populated areas 
Timber forests with high demand 
for non-timber products 
 
Table 2. Hypotheses on the Optimal Management Institutions of Timber and Non-timber 
Forests 
 Management Intensity 
Low High 
 
Cost of 
Protection 
Low 
Any  
(non-timber forests) 
Private or individual management 
(timber forests) 
High 
Community management 
(non-timber forests) 
Mixed private-community 
management (timber forests) 
 
 
